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I. INTRODUCTION
During the first century of our country's history, employer-
employee relations were governed by the "employment at will" doctrine,
which allows the employment relation to be severed by the employer for
good cause, bad cause, or no cause. This doctrine limits employees'
rights by giving tremendous discretion and latitude to employers with
regard to the conduct of their particular business enterprises and the
qualitative and quantitative nature of their work force.' Following World
War I, the employees' rights movement gathered support and culminated
in the unionization of much of this nation's capital industry.
Consequently, in the union2 context, most wrongful discharge disputes are
settled through alternative means, including arbitration, identified and
agreed upon in collective bargaining agreements. However, non-union
employees3 obviously do not possess union protection, leaving them and
their employers no options but to drop their claims or to seek remedy for
wrongful discharge disputes in the courts.4
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1. For a general discussion of the development of Labor Law and the erosion of the "at
will" doctrine, see Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee As
Affected By Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies As To Discharge, 33
A.L.R.4th 120 (1984).
2. For purposes of this analysis, a "union" employee is one whose employment is
protected by a collective bargaining agreement, a civil service statute, or an equivalent state
statute that requires just cause for discharge.
3. Conversely, for purposes of this analysis, a "non-union employee" is one who is not
protected by a collective bargaining agreement, a civil service statute, or an equivalent state
statute that requires just cause for discharge.
4. See A. WESTIN & A. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WITHOUT
LITIGATION 2 (1988).
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Employers and employees5 by the thousands have decided to
exercise the second option. More than 20,000 unjust discharge cases are
pending in state courts. 6 Employees are unwilling to dismiss instances of
perceived injustice. At the same time, employers are unwilling to become
hostage to an employee's threat of a lawsuit. This stalemate results in
frustration and a significant waste of money and time brought on by the
tremendous cost, unpredictability, and discomfort of trial.
A closer look at the issues of cost, predictability of outcome, and
uneasiness with the adversarial process indicates that the experience of a
trial leaves much to be desired. In terms of costs, these are largely
driven by the expense of legal representation. A recent study by the
RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice found that merely the
employer's costs of unjust discharge cases were increased by attorney's
fees ranging on average from $81,000 to $208,000 per case.7 The cost of
trial seems, on its face, to indicate that both parties may consider another,
less costly means of dispute resolution if it could guarantee adequate
resolution of disputes at a lower cost.
The decision to suffer the experience of a trial has been further
aggravated by the unpredictability of jury trials,' although there is a bias
favoring employees.9  Despite this bias, it is not clear that either
employees, or employers, favor an adversarial means of settling their
disputes despite a potential windfall in the event of a punitive damage
award. Logically, an alternative means of conflict resolution that makes
the process more equitable, if it were available, would be preferred.
Lastly, trials tend to aggravate an already uncomfortable situation.
Implicit in a decision to dismiss an employee is the desire to sever the
employee's relationship with the employer. Ironically, when a disgruntled
employee brings suit, the relationship between employer and employee is
often extended over a period of many months, or even years, as the
dispute goes through the court system. Arguably, it is best to shorten the
5. As the focus of this Article is the effect of the Federal Arbitration Act with respect
to non-union arbitration agreements, hereinafter, all references to employees should be
construed as pertaining to non-union employees, unless otherwise noted.
6. See WESTIN & FELIU, supra note.4. Though this number has not been broken down
between union and non-union cases, it is presumed that the majority of these cases involve
the claims of non-union employees, since wrongful discharge cases in the union context are
often settled through binding arbitration as a result of collective-bargaining agreements.
7. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 182, at A-10 (Sept. 20, 1988).
8. For a discussion of attitudes toward jury trials, see Graham, Validity of Contractual
Waiver of Right to Trial by a Jury in Texas Civil Cases, 52 TEX. BAR J. 1126 (1989) ("With
increasing jury damage awards many businesses have sought to limit their liability by
including jury waiver provisions in all contracts.").
9. A recent study of California wrongful discharge cases showed employees winning
78% of those cases that go before a jury, with punitive damages being awarded in 40% of
the cases and with an average damage award in excess of $425,000. (quoting Victor
Schacter). Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at A-4 (Feb. 24, 1987).
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time of conflict and to lessen the degree of adversity between the parties."
An alternative that hastens the process of resolution, and at the same time
somewhat eases the adversarial angst engendered by participating in a
trial, is preferable."
Given the problems of cost, predictability, and discomfort
associated with conflict resolution by means of a trial, it is no wonder
that, over the last decade and a half, employers, and to a lesser extent,
employees, have sought alternative means of settling their wrongful
discharge disputes. In an effort to eliminate the negative aspects of trial
experience but still resolve the conflict, many firms have considered
various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Some have
adopted internal grievance procedures similar to those adopted by
unionized shops. Other firms have changed management style to reflect
the "open door" availability of managers and supervisors. Thirdly,
arbitration has been gaining increasing popularity over the past several
years.'
When considering arbitration, one needs to ask: "Why is it
preferable to trial?" What about arbitration makes it a viable alternative
to the cost, predictability, and discomfort problems of judicial conflict
resolution? Of primary merit is the difference between the nature of the
arbitration experience as compared to the trial experience.
Ideally and psychologically, arbitration requires individuals to look
to themselves and to their own resources to resolve their employment
contract conflicts.? By its nature arbitration assumes that the adversarial
court system is not sufficient in its representation of an individual's
interests and that the formalism of the court system makes impossible the
use of humanistic elements such as rationality, cooperation and
10. Thomas Carbonneau provides statistical accounts of the impact of adversarial
procedure upon divorce litigation in Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119. He finds that the attention paid to procedural
matters, the subsequent delays, and the increase in the length of proceedings resulting from
the gamesmanship of adversarial posturing usually exacerbate rather than attenuate the
spouses' conflicts. Id. at 1120-1123. The more adversarial the posturing on one side, the
more the other side will feel obliged to counter with its own attack. Id. at 1123, n.4.
11. For a discussion that contrasts adversarial and non-adversarial settlement
negotiation, see Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a
Theory, 1983 AM. 3. FOUND. RES. J. 905 (1983) and Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754
(1984).
12. See generally WESTIN & FELIU, supra note 4.
13. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory
Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DIS. RES. 231, 236, n.22 (1990) ("Legal adjudicatory institutions
are paralyzed by the intricacies and sophistication of their own processes. The analytical
rigor of legal reasoning and complex formalism of legal procedure are inadequate substitutes
for individual rationality, personal understanding, and mutual cooperation in the quest to
gain the civil resolution of conflictual circumstances.").
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understanding. 4 By turning to the arbitration process, individuals state
that their interests are best -served by a process that relies on humanistic
elements to greater extent than the adversarial court system.
Given its reliance on humanistic elements, arbitration provides for
flexible dispute resolution that "yields informed, fair, and binding
determinations." 6 Arbitration counters the discomfort of the trial process
by recognizing that as a goal, in addition to a fair resolution of conflict,
the establishment and maintenance of "a basis for constructive interaction
in the midst of dispute and its aftermath. " 17  Given this perspective,
arbitration removes a dispute from the parentalism of the courts and
allows the parties "to assume responsibility for and exercise basic
governance over their adjudicatory destiny. " 8
In addition to the beneficence of its nature, arbitration and
employment contracts that require the arbitration of wrongful discharge
claims, provide significant benefits not found in the adversarial system.
First, arbitration involves a significant lowering of the cost of resolving
employment disputes. Trials are expensive, and they force both parties to
incur costs with regard to court fees, and other expenses that are not
incurred when one agrees to arbitration. These include costs associated
not only with the use of the courts, but costs of preparation as well. In
arbitration, the range of issues that can be discussed in the preparation for
trial is significantly curtailed. The focus of discussion is centered on the
employment contract or employment agreement, and the issues decided by
an arbitrator focus on whether an employee was dismissed in accordance
with that agreement. The narrow confines of the dispute limit the costs
associated with its resolution. Since most of a trial's costs are associated
with attorney's fees, it is interesting to note that a recent report by
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells to the New York Stock Exchange noted that the
legal costs of a trial were 79.66 percent of the award, while the same
costs were 28.75 percent of arbitration awards. 9 The report also showed
that the amount of the original claim was significantly lower in those
14. Id. ("Antihumanistic both in its principle and in its practice, the adversarial ethic
works a subterfuge on society. It is deceitful not only as to its concern for individual
interests, but also in its regard for legality and the integrity of the substantive law.').
15. Id. ("The social contract for adjudication must be founded upon collective
consensus about the true potential and disposition of the human personality when it confronts
disagreement.").
16. Id. at 231, n.l.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Letter from Deloitte, Haskins & Sells to the New York Stock Exchange (undated)
(copy on file at the Indiana Law Review) (cited in Hermann, Arbitration of Securities
Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65
IND. L.J. 697, 722 (1990) (Although the statistics presented pertain specifically to customer-
originated claims in securities disputes, the relation between litigation and arbitration
depicted is considered normative for the purposes of this discussion).
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cases going to arbitration, but that the amount of a damage award was
greater, as was the amount of the award as a percentage of the original
claim.2°  This provides an indication that arbitration may provide
significant benefits to the prevailing party while costing the losing party
less because of the decreased attorney fees.
Second, arbitration agreements provide a peaceful and prompt way
of solving disputes. Both sides are given an even playing field, and
because of the narrow range of issues, in most instances the dispute can
be heard relatively quickly. These factors thereby relieve both parties of
the angst associated with a festering, bad relationship, as often happens
when using the judicial system. The Deloitte Report indicates that parties
are able to lessen the time required to resolve their dispute by an average
of 165 days.2' Furthermore, one scholar has pointed to the relief from
court congestion that results from the use of arbitration as a primary
reason for the public policy that favors arbitration."
An arbitration agreement also gains merit because it can be used to
support claims of fairness and even-handedness in employment-related
litigation. A mandatory arbitration agreement in an employment contract
provides evidence to a jury that the employer recognizes his significant
advantages with regard to the employer-employee relationship, and that he
has willingly sacrificed these advantages in an effort of fairness and
cordiality by providing the dismissed employee with an opportunity to
resolve any dispute through arbitration at the employer's expense.
Finally, arbitration is meant to provide a binding resolution to a
dispute. This assumes, of course, the proper formalities are followed and
that the company is willing to let a third party resolve the dispute. This
benefit is closely related to that of avoiding the costs of litigation, as any
binding resolution to a dispute and/or establishment of facts resolves
issues that do not have to be litigated in the future.
The above listing of the benefits associated with resolving an
employment dispute by arbitration, as well as others pointed out by
various scholars," raises the question: Why would any employment
20. Id.
21. Id. (Of 420 cases surveyed, the average elapsed time of a litigated case was 599
days, while the average elapsed time of an arbitrated case was 434 days.).
22. See Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 233 ("The Court favors arbitration because it
can lighten judicial caseloads while not expressly denying access to justice.").
23. See P. Gillette & J. Flanagan, Paper delivered to the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Law Section 2, 2-3 (Aug. 8, 1989)
("Employers benefit economically from arbitration by reduced legal fees, less likelihood of
huge awards driven by the emotions of the jury, less adverse publicity, and less time spent
by management employees assisting in the defense of the claim.").
The benefits of arbitration provisions in general have been studied in the academic
community. It is assumed here that the majority of benefits found as being derivative of
arbitration in the union context will also be present in the non-union context. In a recent
article, eighteen reasons have been identified that support the adoption of some alternative
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disputes be resolved by resort to formal litigation? After all, people
should logically approach the method of dispute resolution that exacts the
least cost, both monetarily and psychologically. Indeed, this approach
favoring arbitration is seen in the context of union employment
agreements.
In addition to the benefits noted above, part of arbitration's
popularity in the union context is derived from the view that it is favored
by public policy.24 Also, courts are held to a strict standard of review of
the arbitrator's decision -- only being able to overturn arbitration decisions
when the arbitrator has exceeded his authority as provided in the
collective-bargaining agreement.2s
Given its popularity, one would guess that arbitration would be
equally as popular in the non-union context. Yet, the arbitration of labor
disputes has been, until the recent past, the almost exclusive domain of
parties to collective-bargaining agreements.2
Arbitration's limited usage in the non-union context was
historically due to managerial concepts of workplace control. In the past,
many non-union employers ignored the benefits of arbitration and
considered the "idea of arbitrating whether an employer had 'just cause'
for a particular employment decision an infringement on management's
prerogative which could only lead to mediocrity and institutionalized gripe
sessions."" It is only in recent history that the costs, unpredictability, and
discomfort of the adversarial judicial system have reached such a level
that parties to non-union employment agreements have increasingly begun
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism. Guidry & Huffman, Legal and Practical Aspects of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Non-Union Companies, 6 THE LAB. LAw. 1, 27 (1990).
Furthermore, an equal effort has been made at identifying the pitfalls of arbitration. Fifteen
disadvantages of such a system have been identified. Id. at 28-29. Many of the "pros" and
"cons" focus on "soft" concepts, i.e., the mental and psychological welfare of employees at
both the working and supervisory level. While this welfare is of concern, the difficulty of
quantifying these factors makes them difficult to evaluate, consequently they are not
considered in any significant detail in this analysis. For the purposes of this discussion, the
benefits, and to the extent necessary, the pitfalls, of arbitration in the non-union context are
limited to the legal and economic impact of mandatory arbitration provisions.
24. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
25. In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases, subsequently known as the
"Steelworkers' Trilogy," that established arbitration as a means of dispute resolution favored
by public policy, and established that courts may only overturn an arbitration decision when
the arbitrator exceeded his authority as provided in the collective-bargaining agreement.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also
Guidry & Huffman, supra note 23, at 5.
26. P. Gillette & J. Flanagan, supra note 23, at 2 ("Until the 1980s, arbitration and
mediation were words reserved for discussions among unionized employers.").
27. Id.
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to view arbitration as a means of dispute resolution that could benefit both
the employer and the employee.'
Assuming that non-union employers and employees would benefit
from the use of mandatory " arbitration agreements to the same extent as
their union counterparts, it seems axiomatic that such arbitration
provisions would be widely included in employment contracts between
employers and non-union employees and that non-union employment
contracts would involve arbitration agreements to the same extent as union
contracts. However, this is not the case, as seen by the magnitude of
wrongful discharge cases pending in the courts."0
This paradox requires either the reexamination and eventual
dismissal of assumptions regarding the benefits of arbitration, or the
injection of new factors into the decision of whether to use arbitration.
The latter option proves most effective.
Recalling that the benefits of arbitration were postulated in an
"ideal world, "3t there exist assumptions inherent in such a world that do
not necessarily prevail in our version of reality. The saliency of using
arbitration presumes that arbitration provides for flexible dispute
resolution that "yields informed, fair, and binding determinations."3 1 If
public policy, laws, or treatment of arbitral decisions by the courts do not
reflect the idea that arbitration yields such decisions, the foundation of the
argument for using arbitration is destroyed.
When assessing whether the foundation of the argument to use
arbitration to settle wrongful discharge disputes is made of brick or straw,
the discussion tends to focus on the issues of exhaustion, preclusion.' and
28. P. Gillette & J. Flanagan, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that "arbitration is an
alternative which can offer both the employer and the employee many of the benefits of civil
litigation without the expense, time delays, and procedural morass often associated with the
court system").
29. The use of the word "mandatory" refers to the nature of the agreement between
employers and employees whereby both parties voluntarily agree to submit all wrongful
discharge claims to arbitration. It is this submission to arbitration that becomes mandatory.
Consequently, all references to non-union arbitration agreements assume that the agreements
provide for mandatory arbitration unless otherwise noted. It is recognized that statutes
compelling employers and employees to submit controversies to state arbitration are
unconstitutional as they create a system requiring employers and employees to engage in a
business relationship on terms not of their own making. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286
(1924).
30. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32. Carbonneau,supra note 13, at 231, n.1.
33. See Mazurak, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Claims: Erclusiviy,
Exhaustion, and Preclusion, 64 U. DaT. L. REv. 623, 624 (1987):
The employer and employee must know whether the ADR must be
exhausted, either in lieu of, or as a prerequisite to, judicial action. The
employee who is required to exhaust the ADR prior to judicial action may
lose valuable employment rights if exhaustion is not sought. The
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enforceability. 4 If employees or employers lack faith that their agreement
to arbitrate provides preclusive effect as to subsequent litigation, or that it
will be enforced, their incentive to reach agreement on the use of
arbitration is fatally damaged. At best, these agreements become nothing
more than ad hoe anomalies; 3s at worst, they become instruments of
exploitation.m The evolution of arbitration doctrine has contributed to a
degree of confusion with regard to the use of arbitration agreements. The
lack of universal acceptance of arbitration agreements, and the disdain for
mandatory arbitration provisions in non-union employment agreements,
are directly attributable to this confusion.37
However, the application and interpretation of non-union
arbitration agreements by the federal courts in the recent past belies their
reputation for impotency and uselessness. It is hypothesized that the
reluctance toward using arbitration agreements and the confusion
surrounding the enforceability, exhaustion, and preclusion of these
agreements have been directly related to two key areas: (1) uncertainty
about whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the federal statute
designed to govern arbitration, is applicable to the vast majority of non-
union employment contracts, and (2) the inapplicability of the FAA to
wrongful discharge disputes if the dispute involves a claim pertaining to a
statutorily created right.
Fortunately for those favoring the use of arbitration, over the past
few years the federal courts have made decisions that erode the historical
employee who obtains reinstatement and back pay from the ADR has
nothing unless the award is enforced by a court. The employer that
establishes elaborate due process procedures in an ADR unenforced by the
courts has established a hollow procedure. The employer that prevails in
the ADR has only a momentary victory if it must litigate the discharge
again in the judicial forum. If ADR's are to be useflul, other than as ad
hoc anomalies, the concepts of exclusivity, exhaustion, and preclusion
must be considered.
The issues of exhaustion and preclusion are dealt with at great length in Part III, infra pp.
17-40.
34. The issue of enforceability concerns whether the arbitration agreement was made in
accordance with the principles of contract. See infra p. 17.
35. See Mazurak, supra note 33, at 624.
36. If an arbitration agreement is entered into by two parties, one of which knows that
the likelihood of enforcements is minimal, the knowledgeable party may be able to seek
concessions from the other by offering the useless arbitration agreement as consideration,
thus exploiting the good faith of the ignorant party.
37. As examples of more recent articles that identify this confusion, and consequently
question the saliency of the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in general, see Mazurak,
supra note 33; Guidry & Huffman, supra note 23; Carbonneau, supra note 13. See also
Dreyer, Arbitration Agreements After Volt and Browning-Ferris, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 667
(1990); Note, A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protection For
Aged Employees?, 35 VILL. L. REv. 389 (1990); Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1137 (1986).
38. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
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reluctance to resort to arbitration for employment dispute settlement. The
courts have used the FAA to give precision to the issues of exhaustion,
preclusion, and enforceability with regard to non-union arbitration
provisions for wrongful discharge claims; culminating most recently in a
Supreme Court decision that destroyed all but the most rudimentary
fragments of the statutorily created rights and adhesion barriers to
applying contract principles when interpreting the FAA and arbitration
agreements in the business context.3 9 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear a case" concerning the exhaustion of arbitral proceedings
when the claim is based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),4" which is closely analogous to claims based on Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 and would serve as strong precedent for
establishing the arbitrability of both types of claims.
This Article demonstrates that non-union, mandatory arbitration
agreements have been approved by Congress and the federal courts as
legitimate means for resolving wrongful discharge disputes without
recourse to the federal judiciary system. Furthermore, it predicts that,
when deciding Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme
Court will reinforce this approval of arbitration as it will decide that
statutory rights claims provide no exception to the exhaustion of the
arbitral process.
The remainder of the Article is divided into two distinct parts.
Part II discusses Congress' intent to create a public policy favoring
arbitration by giving validity to non-union arbitration agreements through
the FAA. It demonstrates that proper interpretation of the FAA should
not prevent the use of arbitration agreements. Part III discusses the
courts' interpretation of the FAA and the evolution of the interpretation of
arbitration agreements, when the wrongful discharge dispute involves a
claim pertaining to a statutorily created right. It is comprised of analyses
of the development of the law in this area with regard to the issues of
exhaustion and preclusion. This Part concludes that the exception, which
does not compel arbitration that is accorded to claims concerning such
congressionally created rights, has been eroded *and that arbitration of
such claims is permitted and may be compelled. The overall analysis
39. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477(1989).
40. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990) (certiorari granted with regard to the question of whether
claims brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are subject to
compulsory arbitration). See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1988).
43. For a statement assessing the similarity between ADEA claims and Title VII
claims, see Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106, n:3 (5th Cir. 1990).
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finds that federal policy with regard to non-union arbitration agreements
has been established such that the courts' treatment of arbitral decisions is
no longer in question, inviting the widespread use of these non-union
employment agreements.
II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Scope of the Act
U.S. public policy favors the peaceful, private resolution of
disputes."4  Consequently, Congress, in 1925, enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act to formally recognize the nation's acceptance of arbitration
as a legitimate means of dispute resolution.4o In doing so, it established
that the FAA preempts contrary state law and identifies a uniform national
policy favoring arbitration. 4'
The FAA was enacted by Congress to overturn judicial precedent
refusing enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, and to eradicate the
injustice resulting from this judicial refusal. 47 Congress also recognized
that a policy supporting arbitration would reduce the expense and delay of
litigation. 4  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the
reduction of the expense and time of litigation is not the Act's primary
purpose; instead, the Court has trumpeted the Congressional intent to
44. Nelson, Arbitration Today: Some Threshold Issues, 52 TEX. BAR J. 1013 (1989).
45. Id. ("The pro-arbitration policy takes statutory form in the Federal Arbitration Act.
46. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I
(1984). See also Gillette & Flanagan, supra note 23, at 3.
47. H.R. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924):
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their
own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate
upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their
jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted
with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment,
although they have frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical
nature and the injustice which results from it. This bill declares simply
that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.
48. Id. ("It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when
there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can
be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid
and enforceable.'). See Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367,
1372 (D.D.C. 1972) (the basic purpose of the United States Arbitration Act is to relieve the
parties from costly litigation and help ease congested court dockets); Robert Lawrence Co.
v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909,
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
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ensure the judicial enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements. 49 In
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, a case involving a dentist suing his
broker with whom he had a written agreement to arbitrate any disputes
that might arise out of the account, for alleged violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and various state-law provisions, the Court found
that:
The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose
behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately
made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion
that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the
expeditious resolution of claims. The Act, after all, does not
mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the
enforcement-upon motion of one of the parties-of privately
negotiated arbitration agreements.5'
The Act was also drafted with the intention of being used to govern the
applicability of arbitration agreements and to guarantee that in the use of
these agreements, the parties preserved their fundamental rights. s
In meeting its objective of making arbitration agreements
enforceable, the Act declares that "an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."s2 Furthermore, the Act asserts that in reference to agreements
to arbitrate wrongful discharge disputes that all options for achieving
successful arbitration be fully exhausted by the parties before they may
resort to other means of dispute resolution s
In order to guarantee the exhaustion of the arbitration process, the
Act requires the courts to compel arbitration, as required by an arbitration
agreement, before other tangential proceedings may be instituted. s' The
compelling of an arbitration hearing preserves the contract between the
parties and guarantees that one who has given consideration in exchange
for. the agreement to arbitrate receives the benefit of his or her bargain.
49. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
50. Id. at 219.
51. Nelson, supra note 44, at 1013 (The FAA provides "procedural requisites, such as
acknowledgement and disclosure, which are intended to guard against the possibility of
unintentional waiver of the right to a day in court.").
52. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
53. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988) (stating that "the court ... shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been held in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.").
54. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) ("If the jury finds that an agreement for arbitration was made
in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof.").
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In addition to compelling an arbitration hearing, under the FAA,
arbitrators may compel the attendance of witnesses,"' and their awards
may be confirmed by the courts.5 6 Additionally, the FAA endorses the
use of arbitration and supports arbitral findings by permitting arbitral
decisions to be vacated only in limited circumstances. s7
It is clear that the FAA is designed to enforce arbitration
agreements and to make their use- more popular by guaranteeing their
enforceability and exhaustion. Yet, the FAA's intent and its practical
effect have been at odds due to confusion with regard to the Act's
applicability and scope.
In order to understand the confusion associated with the Act's
scope, one must understand both the applicability of the Act and the
limitations of the Act. In terms of its applicability, because the FAA is a
federal statute, before it may be applied to a particular case alleging
wrongful discharge, two findings must be made: (1) a written agreement
to arbitrate wrongful discharge claims exists, and (2) the non-union
employment agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate
commerce or some other means that provides for federal jurisdiction!'
For purposes of this discussion, a written agreement to arbitrate is
presumed. Thus, it is necessary to address the question of how to
determine whether the non-union employment agreement evidences a
transaction that provides for federal jurisdiction, if by no other means than
it evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce.
The most obvious example of a federal wrongful discharge claim is
one arising between federal employees and the government. If this is the
limit of scope intended by Congress, the FAA's application to the small
segment of the population employed by the federal government provides
no real model, nor any significant direction with regard to other disputes.
Fortunately, legislative history suggests that Congress intended something
more than merely making federal employment arbitration agreements
enforceable. The House Report states: "[t]he purpose of this bill is to
make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in
contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or
admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
55. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
56. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
57. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) (an arbitral decision may be vacated where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; where partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators is evident; where the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct; and, where the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers).
58. See American Home Assur. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 961, 963
(1980), citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (stating that "before the
Federal Arbitration Act becomes applicable to the instant case, two findings must be made:
(1) there was an agreement in writing providing for arbitration and (2) the contract evidences
a transaction involving interstate commerce.").
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courts."s9 It is further contended that Congress intended the FAA to have
a broader reach, largely out of fear that without a broader jurisdictional
base, the FAA would be undermined by federal judges, state courts, or
state legislatures. 60 Consequently, the FAA applies to arbitration
agreements involving employers and employees engaged in businesses that
are protected by Congress under its commerce powers61 because they fall
within the congressional definition of "interstate commerce."
To clearly discern the range of cases now considered subject to the
FAA, one must have an appreciation for the meaning of "interstate
commerce." Congress has defined "interstate commerce" rather
expansively - most clearly in its discussions on the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA) and its subsequent amendments.v
On the theory that sub-minimum wages and substandard labor
conditions burden interstate commerce and obstruct the free flow of
goods,63 Congress developed the "enterprise test of coverage" among other
tests to determine whether an employee, employer, or business is engaged
in interstate commerce. ' Under this test, it makes no difference who
ships or produces goods, or whether their interstate movement ended
before they were handled, sold, or worked on by employees. 6s All that is
necessary is that the goods or materials handled, sold, or worked on,
moved across state lines during the course of business.
66
It is further provided that employees engaged in interstate
commerce are all "employees of any 'enterprise' engaged in commerce or
production for commerce." 67 The practical effect of defining "interstate
commerce" in the FLSA is that Congress has essentially brought within
the reach of its authority each and every employee in the nation engaging
in interstate activities." Given this expansive approach to defining
"interstate commerce," and accepting its applicability to other federal law,
59. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (cited in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984)).
60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-16; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987).
61. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 8 ("[The Congress shall have the Power] to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.").
62. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1990).
63. 35 TEX. JUR. 2D Labor § 9 (1966).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; See Munn v. Moeller, 251 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
67. CONG. RESEARCH SERv., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERIcA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 177, n.2(1973).
68. 35 TEx. JUR. 2D Labor § 9 (1966).
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virtually all non-union employment relationships69 affected by agreements
to arbitrate wrongful discharge claims can be characterized as being
involved in interstate commerce, and thus they are subject to regulation by
the FAA.
B. Limitations of the FAA
Given this discussion of the Act's applicability, its limitations must
be addressed. Because the FAA represents the codification of a national
policy favoring arbitration, its applicability and scope should only be
limited by the Act itself, and any future congressional statutory limitation.
The only limitation to the Act's scope is found within the text of section
1, which states that "nothing herein shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 70  It is within this limitation
of the Act's scope that the confusion has arisen.
As in any case in which governmental reach is so broad, it is
necessary to exempt certain groups from its control in order to avoid
injustices, inequities, and hardships. 7' Consequently, exemptions from the
jurisdiction of the FAA are provided to employers, employees, and
businesses to whom the application of the FAA is either impractical or
impossible.? As noted earlier, the FAA provides for exemptions in
section 1 where it states: "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in a foreign or interstate commerce."73
Unfortunately, the wording of this exclusion creates a paradox and
belies the ability to interpret the FAA from a textualist perspective. 74
69. An "employer-employee relationship" involved in interstate commerce, and thus
subject to the FAA, includes personal service contracts with businesses engaged in interstate
commerce. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401, n.7
(1967); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972).
The one recognized exception to holding contracts for personal services as the subjects of
interstate commerce is when the interstate activity is baseball. Federal Base Ball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The reasoning applied to exempt baseball from the
category of interstate commerce cannot be applied to other employment relationships as it
has been limited to the subject of baseball. United States v. Schubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955);
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). But see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (The
Court identifies two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by
the FAA: "they must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract 'evidencing a
transaction involving commerce' and such clauses may be revoked upon 'grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'").
71. 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 2317 (1979).
72. Id.
73. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
74. For a discussion of the pros and cons associated with a textualist style of statutory
interpretation, see Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990).
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Employers or employees, seeking to compel the settling of wrongful
discharge disputes through arbitration, often find the FAA applicable to
their particular employment situation by virtue of congressional expansion
of the definition of "interstate commerce," as derived from the "enterprise
test of coverage." However, section 1 of the FAA applies an express
exclusion from the FAA for the "class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."7s This exclusion can be literally interpreted so as to
disqualify firms from applying the FAA with the exact words by which
they are able to make the FAA applicable. Literally read, interpretation
of the FAA is marked by absurdity, with the FAA applying to all
employees engaged in interstate commerce, except those engaged in
interstate commerce. Logic and respect for congressional intent demand
that a literal interpretation be considered unacceptable.
Thus, in an effort to avoid absurdity, non-textual interpretation is
required. This paradox is resolved by construing "interstate commerce"
differently depending on the purpose of the construction. Because the
FAA is intended to have broad effect, the definition of "interstate
commerce" with regard to the applicability of the Act is rather broad.
Accordingly, exemption provisions are to be construed narrowly. 76 Thus,
given the tendency to construe exemptions narrowly, courts generally limit
the definition of "interstate commerce" as used in the exemption provision
as applying to employees involved in, or closely related to, the actual
movement of goods in interstate commerce. 7  This has been further
construed as applying only to workers employed in the transportation
industries. 2 In summary, with regard to the Act's applicability to a
specific employment arbitration agreement, the expansive definition of
interstate commerce brings virtually all employee-employer relationships
within the jurisdiction of the Act; with regard to the Act's limitation, a
75. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
76. Precedent exists for requiring the narrow construction of exemptions. A.H.
Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945) (interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Donovan v. Williams Chem. Co., 682 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1982) (interpreting the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
77. Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971), cited in Tenney Eng'g,
Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) and
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical, Radio, and Mach. Workers of America,
235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S.
852 (1957). See also Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (a
contract for personal service with a business engaged in interstate commerce is within the
scope of the FAA); Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. ASEA, AB, 657 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Ark.
1987) (repair on turbine generator not good enough for exclusion because it did not
constitute interstate commerce).
78. Tonetti v. Shirley, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1144, 1146, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1985)
(citing Miller Brewing v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, AFL-CIO, 739 F.2d 1159,
1162 (7th Cir. 1984)) ("Many federal courts of appeal have held this exclusionary clause
applicable only to workers directly engaged in the channels of interstate commerce, i.e.,
workers employed in the transportation industries.").
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narrow construction of the exemption clause removes employees
associated with the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce from
the Act's jurisdiction.
In fact, interpretation of the scope of the FAA has resulted in the
creation of federal substantive law of arbitrability and the presumption of
arbitrability of issues where arbitration may appear likely but is
questionable. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. ,79 a case involving an appeal of a
district court's action staying a federal case pending resolution of a state
court suit because the two suits involved the arbitrability of the
respondent's claims, that:
The effect of the section [Section 2 of the FAA] is to create a
body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.... The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'
Thus, the FAA is the codification of the pro-arbitration policy of
the United States. It is intended to govern mandatory arbitration
agreements for wrongful discharge claims of virtually all employment
relationships through application of the expansive congressional definition
of "interstate commerce." The only exceptions to its applicability are
found in those businesses or employment relationships that meet the
exclusionary criteria within section 1 of the Act. Consequently, the FAA
is a precise instrument for governing the arbitration of wrongful discharge
claims, and the confusion as to its applicability has been eradicated within
the last five years. This former confusion should no longer provide any
impediment to the expansive use of arbitration agreements between
employers and employees in settling their wrongful discharge disputes.
Because the courts have resolved the issue of the applicability of
the FAA as the governing statute of arbitration agreements, the door to
wider use of such agreement in non-union employment contracts has been
partially opened. It is now necessary to assess the validity of the second
major concern deterring the use of arbitration agreements in non-union
employment situations -- the courts' treatment of statutorily created rights.
79. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
80. Id. at 24-25.
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III. THE ARBITRATION OF STATUTORILY CREATED RIGHTS
The incompatibility of arbitration agreements and statutorily
created rights was established by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s.
Prior to this, employment arbitration agreements were regulated by the
contract principles that govern the bargaining context.5 t In addition to
these principles, arbitration agreements were regulated by the FAA.
The FAA states: "a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."82 Thus, a literal reading of the FAA shows that an
agreement to submit employment disputes to arbitration is enforceable
unless there is an error in the actual contracting procedure that permits
revocation of the entire contract. s3
A. A Case Study
In 1974, the Supreme Court altered the concept of the
enforceability of arbitration agreements by removing claims based on
statutory rights from their jurisdiction. That year, the Court decided
81. Within the principles of contract that have been developed for the regulation of the
bargaining context, there are six areas that could apply to void an agreement to arbitrate:
the statute of frauds, incapacity to contract, duress, fraud, improper disclosure or
concealment, and unconscionability. R. ScoTT & D. LESLIE, CoNTRACT LAW AND THEORY
323-469 (1988). For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that an arbitration
agreement has met the requirements of the statute of frauds and that the parties had the
capacity to contract. The remaining areas are subject to elaborate discussion in their own
right and will be discussed as appropriate.
82. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
83. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1-14. But see id. at 18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This is in accord with the interpretation of
arbitration agreements for more than twenty years. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the
Court stated: "Accordingly, the Act, provides that an arbitration agreement such as is here
involved 'shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.'" 417 U.S. 511 (1974). See also Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Gillette & Flanagan, supra note
22, at 4. Indeed, in the past few years, enforcing arbitration agreements in all contract
disputes, including those where specific statutory remedies have been provided, has become
standard practice. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cit. 1990)
('Permitting enforcement of statutory remedies by means of contractual arbitration has thus
become the norm rather than the exception for contracts governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act."). The courts have rejected arguments that enforcing arbitration agreements will result
in an unreasonable restraint of competition because employment may be conditioned on the
acceptance of a mandatory agreement to arbitrate employment disputes. Dickstein v.
duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (Ist Cir. 1971) (On the issue of enforceability, the district court,
noting the grant of self-regulatory authority to stock exchanges under the Securities Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, see Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), held
(1) that it was not "readily apparent" that conditioning approval of employment on
submission to arbitration would result in unreasonable restraint of competition and (2) that,
even assuming such restraint, such a requirement pursuant to Exchange rules approved by
the S.E.C. "does not derogate from the self-regulatory grant of the Securities Act").
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Alexander v. Gardner-Denver CO.14  In this case, the petitioner, Mr.
Alexander, was discharged from his position at Gardner-Denver. His
employment and complaint that his discharge was racially motivated were
governed by an arbitration agreement that had been reached pursuant to a
collective-bargaining agreement. The arbitrator ruled that the petitioner
had been properly discharged, but made no reference to the petitioner's
claim of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Powell, stated that "federal courts have been assigned plenary
powers to secure compliance with Title VII. "ss
Consequently, Justice Powell concluded, "[i]n sum, Title VII's
purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit
his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final
arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement. "6
With this decision, the Court seriously curtailed the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements for the resolution of employment
disputes by making illegitimate the resolution of claims based on
statutorily created rights. Petitioners who lost such claims in arbitration
had the right to bring their claim again in court, thus eroding the benefits
of arbitration." The Court, in essence, found that these claims could not
be interpreted according to contract principles. Subsequently, federal
courts found the statutory rights exception applicable to all labor
arbitration cases, not just those reflective of a collective-bargaining
agreement.8s
By declaring the supremacy of statutorily created rights, the Court
declared them immutable, and thus unable to be contracted around. 9
Immutable rules are justifiable from a normative perspective,'o in that they
84. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id. at 49.
87. The possibility of petitioners bringing their claims a second time removed most of
the incentives to arbitrate as the second suit increased costs, increased the length of dispute
resolution, and further eroded already strained relations.
88. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Fund Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Jackson, 518 F. Supp. 783, 785
(W.D.La. 1981); Wick v. Atlantic Marine Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (the
court rejected any distinction between commercial arbitration clauses and arbitration clauses
in the context of labor-management relations, where the "positive assurance" test originated).
89. For a thorough discussion of the relationship between immutable and default rules,
see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
90. Id. at 88 ("There is surprising consensus among academics at an abstract level on
two normative bases for immutability. Put most simply, immutable rules are justifiable if
society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract.
The former justification turns on parentalism; the latter on externalities."(citation omitted)).
See also I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 346-47
(1978); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972) (discussion of inalienable rules).
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can protect both parties within the. contract and parties outside the
contract. With the goal of protecting parties within the contract,
immutable rules meet the requirements of a policy of parentalism in which
parties to contracts are not considered capable of fully appreciating the
implications of their contract. With the goal of protecting parties outside
the contract, it is argued that immutable rules protect societal interests in
the development of precedent, which would not occur if all parties were
encouraged to contract around the rules and agree to arbitration instead of
pursuing conflict resolution in the courts.9
However, these normative considerations belie the normative value
of freedom of contract. Assuming this value, it is arguable that the Court
erred in Gardner-Denver by not accurately assessing the adequacy of
treating statutorily created rights as default rules,nz and thus subject to
being contracted around. It seems plausible that one party to an
arbitration agreement may have given some consideration in exchange for
the agreement to arbitrate. To deny the preclusion of an arbitral finding
with respect to a statutorily created right denies a party the benefit of the
bargain.
The adequacy of treating these rights as default rules versus
immutable rules gains more credence when one considers their benefits.
Arguably, default rules make for more efficient contracts because they
allow the contracting parties to place a value on the restraint of their
actions, thus eliminating the possibility of the courts or the legislature
improperly valuing their actions. In Gardner-Denver, the Court should
have considered the effects of treating the statutory right to a judicial
decision as a default rule and the consequences of this treatment with
regard to future behavior of contracting parties and the use of
arbitration."
The argument for treating the statutory right as a default rule is
centered on the belief that arbitration is more desirable than litigation.
Given this, parties to an .arbitration agreement have an incentive to
91. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-85 (1984) (Professor Fiss,
in arguing against settlement, highlights the positive aspects of judicial decision-making.).
92. "Default rules have alternatively been termed background, backstop, enabling,
fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presumptive,
standby, standard-form and supplementory [sic] rules." Ayres & Gertner, supra note 89, at
91.
93. Ayres & Gertner state this more eloquently when they state that often:
[tihe majoritarian approach fails to account for the possibly disparate costs
of contracting and of failing to contract around different defaults. For
example, if the majority is more likely to contract around the minority's
preferred default rule (than the minority is to contract around the
majority's rule), then choosing the minority's default may lead to a larger
set of efficient contracts.
Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
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contract around default rules that require litigation. In Gardner-Denver,
when the collective-bargaining agreement was being negotiated, the
parties, preferring not to go to trial in many cases, had an incentive to
contract around the statutory rule.
Given the incentive to contract around the rule, the next question
focuses on completeness and whether the parties were aware of the
potential extent of the scope of the arbitration agreement. In short, in
Gardner-Denver did the parties know that they were agreeing to arbitrate
Title VII claims? In answering this question, the benefit of arguing in
accordance with contract principles in comparison to the two normative
principles discussed above is readily apparent. This question is really one
of completeness.
Discussion should not focus on discerning congressional intent as
much as it should focus on the actual arbitration agreement. If the
statutory right is considered a default rule, the Court still needs to answer
the question: "Was the rule contracted around?"
By asking this question and by treating the statutory rule as a
default, the burden is placed on the parties to make sure that their clear
intent is known via their arbitration agreement. This may go as far as
requiring the agreement to specifically mention its applicability to the
specific statutory right. Employees may have to sign separate covenants
indicating that they understand that they are giving up their statutory
rights. Additionally, these separate covenants may have to be priced
separately. If intent is not clear, the default governs."' If the courts view
a statutory right as near-immutable, in order to protect it, they merely
require a more specific indication of its being contracted around.' s
As is recognized, the greater the cost of contracting around a
default rule, the more it looks like an immutable rule. What the Supreme
Court did in Gardner-Denver was confuse a default rule, which is
somewhat costly to contract around, with an immutable rule.
94. Another option available to the legislature and the courts is the creation of a
"penalty default" rule, which is "designed to give at least one party to the contract an
incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the
contract provision they prefer." Id. at 91. The motivator behind a penalty default is that it
forces contracting around because the default is unacceptable. With regard to arbitration, a
penalty default could be either that the employer wins the dispute or that the employee wins
the dispute, depending on whom the courts or the legislature are attempting to motivate to
take action to contract around the default. With a penalty default geared against the
employer, he bears all the risk of the arbitration agreement not being specific, complete, and
fair. If the court finds the agreement unsatisfactory in any of these areas, the employer
loses the case. Penalty defaults, in essence, place a premium on contract principles. They
value ex ante the cost of non-compliance.
95. Professors Ayres & Gertner recognize this judicial interpretive prerogative. They
state that "[t]here may be situations in which courts should increase the costs of contracting
around defaults to force the majority of parties into a particular channel. For example, if a
certain type of contract generates a mild externality, we may want to discourage most people
from entering this type of contract." Id. at 125.
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B. Subsequent Developments
What has occurred since Gardner-Denver is the resurrection of the
default rule and the return to contract interpretation with regard to
arbitration agreements. This process has taken some time, and it is
possible to blame the lack of use of arbitration in non-union wrongful
discharge disputes on the confusion that this journey home, to the land of
contract, has created. Because the ability to contract around the statutory
right was unknown, the costs of contracting around the right were infinite.
However, the Court has decided several cases in the past few years that
now permit treating statutory rights as default rules and allow some
reasonable assessment of the cost of contracting around these rules. The
remainder of this section looks at the treatment of arbitration agreements
within the framework of the issues of exhaustion and preclusion, the
principle issues on which to assess the value of an arbitration agreement.
This analysis shows how the courts have applied the FAA in interpreting
arbitration disputes, and shows how the courts have moved away from the
treatment of statutory rights as immutable rules.
1. Exhaustion
With the Supreme Court declaring a right to judicial interpretation
of claims based on statutory rights, logic compels the question, "Why go
to arbitration at all?" It seems obvious that parties considering an
agreement to arbitrate would -question the benefit of such an agreement.
The country's employers and employees would not be justified in adopting
such arbitration agreements without additional assurances that neither
party could resort to the judicial forum for the resolution of any claim
before all the provisions of an arbitration agreement were exhausted --
that is before all matters were first decided by an arbitrator.
Without such assurances, a party could weigh her chances in the
arbitration proceeding and bypass it if she felt that her chances were better
in court. Furthermore, without such assurances, parties would have an
incentive to concoct and fabricate violations of their statutory rights in
order to get out of their obligations as defined by the arbitration
agreement. If the exhaustion of the arbitral process, as required by an
arbitration agreement, were waived, arbitration of employment disr.utes
would cease to exist in the non-union context. The agreement to arbitrate
would be, in effect, a paper lion.
Ironically, Congress, in the adoption of the FAA, was sensitive to
this concern and feared that parties would tend to forum shop.
Consequently, it withdrew the power of the states to decide the legitimacy
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of the arbitration agreement,' and gave the courts power to stay court
action until the court either decides that the issue in question is not
arbitrable, as defined by the agreement, or until the arbitration is
complete.
Section 3 of the FAA states that it: "shall on application of one of
the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."" Thus, the
Act provides the rule that arbitration proceedings must be exhausted
before attempting to adjudicate the matter in court.9
The enforcement of this rule is provided by § 4 of the FAA: "[a]
party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition a United
States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.""0 Despite what
appears to be the establishment of a policy of exhaustion, as depicted in
the FAA, the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver sent a strange
signal to the public with regard to the efficacy of using arbitration
agreements. Justice Powell's opinion clearly states that "an individual
does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance
to final arbitration,""' thereby implying an exhaustion requirement.
However, later in the opinion, Justice Powell states that "[t]he purpose
and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts
to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to
arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal."102 The statement
96. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that "[i]n enacting
Section 2 of the federal act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration'). See Gillette & Flanagan,
supra note 23, at 6.
97. Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1370 (D.D.C.
1972) (9 U.S.C. § 3 requires a federal court in which suit has been brought "upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration" to stay the court
action pending arbitration once it is satisfied that the issue is arbitrable under the agreement).
Note that the decision of the court is not whether the question is arbitrable with respect to
the statutory right, but with respect to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The court did
not create a presumptive right to question arbitrability with respect to statutory rights.
98. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
99. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Supreme Court did
marginally narrow the applicability of the stay provision by holding that the stay provisions
of § 3 apply only to the two kinds of contracts specified in §§ I and 2 of the Act, namely
those in admiralty or evidencing transactions in "commerce." As we have already concluded
that "interstate commerce" has been so expansively defined so as to include virtually all
employment relationships, this point has become moot for purposes of our discussion. See
supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
100. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
101. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
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that arbitral decisions will be denied a preclusive effect"W negatively
affects the strong incentive to use arbitration because it no longer
guarantees that arbitration provides binding resolution of conflict.
This announcement that arbitral decisions had no binding effect on
statutory rights claims led naturally to the theory that arbitral decisions
should not be binding at all, thereby completely removing any incentive
for employers and employees to reach arbitration agreements. Gardner-
Denver created the impression that arbitration involving statutory rights
claims was a non-starter. Thus, when employers and employees agreed to
arbitrate wrongful discharge disputes, their agreement was practically
altered so that they agreed to arbitrate all disputes not based on statutory
rights claims.
Recognizing that this strongly eroded the incentive to use
arbitration, and aware that they never intended to refute the fact that
courts could find value in arbitral findings,' 04 the Court began the process
of clarifying this issue, ending with the full adoption of the FAA as the
standard, and thus.requiring the 'exhaustion of all means available as a
result of an arbitration agreement before any further action could be
brought in the courts.
The first major clarification occurred in 1983 when the Supreme
Court decided Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital."' In this case, what
appears to be a motivator for the Court's action is not the desire to clarify
the exhaustion issue, but to deny the opportunity for state court decisions
to have res judicata effect on federal court decisions. The Court
recognized that "a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the state
suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum;
the state court's judgment on the issue would be [res judicata]..""6
The Court further recognized "the fact that federal law provides
the rule of decision on the merits,""' and consequently, that the FAA was
considered to create "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."'s
103. The preclusive effect given to arbitral decisions is discussed in detail later in this
Article. See infra notes 144-185 and accompanying text.
104. The Court had recognized the evidentiary value of arbitral finding in Gardner-
Denver. The opinion states that "[t]he arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). However, its refusal to adopt standards as to the weight accorded
an arbitral decision, did not eliminate the confision as to whether arbitration should proceed
despite the existence of a statutory rights claim. Id. at 60, n. 21.
105. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
106. Id. at 10 (citing Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183-84
(11th Cir. 1981) and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391,
397-98 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
108. Id. at 24.
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The Court concluded that "[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration. . . ""9 Thus, the Court took a
significant step toward resuscitating the use of arbitration agreements by
this declaration of the presumption of arbitrability of all claims.
However, they had not completely declared that courts should compel
arbitration in accordance with the FAA.
In 1985, the Supreme Court took this step and ended most of the
confusion with regard to exhaustion that stemmed from Gardner-Denver.
First, the Supreme Court further limited the statutory rights exception by
developing a two-part test that limited exceptions to (1) statutory claims,
which (2) are limited by legal elements that foreclose the use of arbitra-
tion."' Therefore, non-union agreements to arbitrate wrongful discharge
claims are enforceable unless they are overridden by subsequent, contrary
congressional command.'
The treatment of causes of action comprised of both federal law
claims and pendent state law claims was also a major source of difficulty
for the courts, especially with regard to exhaustion principles. Prior to
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd in 1985, the federal courts of appeals
were divided in their approach to the exhaustion of arbitration procedures,
given the presence of claims based on both federal and state law."'
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had adopted the "doctrine
of intertwining" to ascertain whether or not to compel arbitration of these
causes of action."' This doctrine permits the courts to deny arbitration of
both the arbitrable claims and the pendent state claims if the court
determines that the claims are "sufficiently intertwined factually and
legally..14
109. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
110. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(the Court devised a two-part test: the first prong is to determine whether the parties'
agreement to arbitrate may be interpreted to cover statutory claims; the second and more
important prong, is whether legal limitations "external to the parties' agreement foreclosed
the arbitration of those claims").
I1l. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1990) ('The
Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be
overridden by a contrary congressional command.").
112. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 217. The Court stated that:
These courts acknowledge the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements but offer two reasons why the district courts
nevertheless should decline to compel arbitration in this situation. First,
they assert that such a result is necessary to preserve what they consider to
be the court's exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities claim;
otherwise, they suggest, arbitration of an "intertwined" state claim might
precede the federal proceeding and the factfinding done by the arbitrator
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The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, had
held that "the [Federal] Arbitration Act divests the district courts of any
discretion regarding arbitration in cases containing both arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims, and instead requires that the courts compel
arbitration of arbitrable claims, when asked to do so."ls To these courts,
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, despite the presence of both
federal and pendent state law claims, requires that the court "'not
substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency' for those of
Congress."116 This statement is not merely a caution against the courts
substituting their views for those of Congress; it is also suggestive of a
reaffirmation of the role of the courts as objective arbitbrs. Thus, it can
be viewed as a caution against the courts substituting their views for those
of the contracting parties as well.
In Byrd, a unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, holding that the FAA requires the district
courts to compel arbitration of all claims even where this would result in
potential inefficiency by producing proceedings in separate forums." 7
Justice White, in his concurrence, clearly states that the rationale for
compelling arbitration is based on preserving freedom of contract:
The Court's opinion makes clear that a district court should not
stay arbitration, or refuse to compel it at all, for fear of its
preclusive effect. And I can perceive few, if any, other possible
reasons for staying the arbitration pending the outcome of the
lawsuit. Belated enforcement of the arbitration clause, though a
less substantial interference than a refusal to enforce it all,
nonetheless significantly disappoints the expectations of parties and
frustrates the clear purpose of their agreement.""
In Byrd, the Court determined that the Act leaves no room for
judicial discretion and mandates that district courts shall direct the parties
to proceed to arbitration on those issues as required by their arbitration
agreement."" The Court further found that federal district courts are
might thereby bind the federal court through collateral estoppel. The
second reason they cite is efficiency; by declining to compel arbitration,
the court avoids bifurcated proceedings and perhaps redundant efforts to
litigate the same factual questions twice.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Heinhold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir.
1981)).
117. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) ("We agree with
these latter courts that the Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of
pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the
result would be the possible inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different
forums.").
118. Id. at 225 (White, I., concurring).
119. Id. at 215 (as summarized in the Syllabus by the Reporter of Decisions).
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required under the FAA to grant motions to compel arbitration, even of
pendent claims, despite the possibility that such action could result in the
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.' 20
The Supreme Court has completely opened the door with regard to
the exhaustion issue by finding that even statutory rights claims can be
compelled to arbitration. Following Byrd, in 1987 the Court decided
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.12 ' This case involved a
complaint by petitioner against Shearson/American Express, Inc. alleging
account churning and violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).22 The
customer account agreement between the parties required the arbitration of
all disputes. The respondent moved to compel this arbitration and the
district court granted the motion to compel arbitration on all claims except
the RICO claim.'3
Upon appeal by the respondents, the court of appeals upheld the
ruling that the RICO claims were non-arbitrable ti and also found the
section 10(b) claims to be non-arbitrable after applying the Wilko2 s
doctrine.'2 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed both findings,
while unanimously agreeing that the RICO claim was subject to
arbitration.'2 Furthermore, the Court identified the valid means of
determining the existence of a contrary congressional command, which
120. Id. See also, American Home Assur. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 629 F.2d
961, 964 (4th Cir. 1980) which said:
Mercury is clearly entitled to a stay of the third-party action. And since questions of fact
common to all actions pending in the present matter are likely to be settled during the
Mercury-Vecco arbitration, we find that all litigation should be stayed pending the arbitration
proceedings. While it is true that the arbitrator's findings will not be binding as to those not
parties to the arbitration, considerations of judicial economy and avoidance of confusion and
possible inconsistent results nonetheless militate in favor of staying the entire action.
121. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) [hereinafter McMahon III], rev'g McMahon v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter McMahon II],
aff'g in part, rev'g in part McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter McMahon I].
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
123. McMahon I, 618 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
124. McMahon II, 788 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1986).
125. This doctrine refers to Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In this decision the
Supreme Court held that the Securities Exchange Act created statutory rights that barred
enforcement of arbitration agreements regarding claims under § 12(2) of the Securities Act.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). The Court held that this section created a non-waivable right to
a judicial forum and that the arbitration process was unlikely to adequately protect federal
policies. Id. at 434-35. See also Note, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and
New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J. 697, 699 (1990)
[hereinafter Indiana Note].
126. McMahon II, 788 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. McMahon III, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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emphasized a presumption of arbitrability.tm Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, stated that the FAA "mandates enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims."2
In 1989, the Supreme Court finally overruled Wilko in Rodriguez
de QuUas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,'" a case involving a group
of investors suing their brokerage firm, alleging that the broker had made
unauthorized and fraudulent trades that caused them to lose money." In
finding the case arbitrable, the Court declared "[w]e now conclude that
Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing
uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration
agreements in the setting of business transactions. " The Court had
earlier defined the prevailing uniform construction of arbitration
agreements. In the words of Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
the Court said that "[tie the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with
our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method
of resolving disputes."" The Court redefined its policy favoring
arbitration and recognized that its "current" policy is different than
expressed in previous years. The Court has declared that statutory rights
128. Id. at 226-27.
The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver
of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent "will be deducible
from [the statute's] text or legislative history," or from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes. (citation
omitted).
Id.
This reliance on express, contrary congressional command to overturn a
presumption of arbitrability of a mandatory non-union arbitration agreement for wrongful
discharge claims goes so far as to presume that employers and employees are on an equal
negotiating plateau, thereby rejecting the invalidity of non-union arbitration agreements based
on adhesion contract principles. Gillette & Flanagan, supra note 23, at 10 ("Adhesion
contract principles like those utilized in Scissor-Tail [Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.
3d 807, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981)], however, are no longer applicable in
light of Perry and Keating. Rather, the courts seem to be compelling arbitration except
when federal law invalidates an arbitration provision or state law invalidates the entire
contract."). See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
627 (1985); Bayma v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 784 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1986); Tonetti v. Shirley, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1144, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1985) ("The
overwhelming weight of authority compels us to conclude California adhesion contract
principles are inapplicable to the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a contract governed
by the Act.").
129. McMahon III, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
130. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
131. Id. at 1918-19.
132. Id. at 1922.
133. Id. at 1920.
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should not bar the requirement of the exhaustion of arbitration provisions
before pursuing any claim in the courts.
3 4
The U.S. Supreme Court recently has added additional credence to
the treatment of arbitration in accordance with the principles of freedom
of contract. It held that the exhaustive effect of an arbitration agreement
is merely operative as a default interpretation of the FAA. Parties to a
non-union arbitration agreement may contract around the presumption of
an exhaustive effect. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Leland
Stanford Jr. University, the Court concluded that where "the parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules
according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals
of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed .. .,',
This interpretation again shows the demise of the Court's
differentiating between contract rights and statutory rights. Statutory
rights interpretation implies that these rights are treated as immutable.
The Court found the right to exhaustion of arbitration agreements to be a
default. This treatment demonstrates the Court's growing preference for
interpretation based on contract.
With the decisions in Rodriguez and Volt, the confusion created by
Gardner-Denver should be eradicated, and in terms of exhaustion, the
principles of contract should govern all agreements to arbitrate, including
those pertaining to wrongful discharge disputes. However, despite the
saliency of the contract-based argument, lower federal courts have applied
the holdings of Rodriguez and Volt differently. Since the date of the
Rodriguez holding,36 there has been a division of the courts with respect
to the arbitrability of claims based on both Title VII and the ADEA, 3'
some finding the above holdings and contract principles applicable to all
statutory rights claims, others limiting the holdings to securities and RICO
claims and denying the parties the right to contract around their other
statutory rights.
134. It is important to recognize that in 1985, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the statutory rights found in the antitrust laws do not provide an exception to enforcing
arbitration under the FAA. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
135. 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
136. May 15, 1989.
137. With regard to Title VII, decisions of the following cases depict this division:
Alford v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990) (contra arbitration);
Roe v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., No. 88 Civ. 8507, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1990)
(1990 WL52200) (pro arbitration); Utley v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir.
1989) (contra arbitration).
With regard to the ADEA, the following cases depict this division: Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted 111 S. Ct. 41
(1990) (pro arbitration); Pierce v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 90-C-0722, slip op.,
(N.D.Ill. Apr. 25, 1990) (1990 WL60751) (pro arbitration); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc.,
877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989)(contra arbitration).
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Fortunately, this past October, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,3 a case that
presents the question of whether claims brought pursuant to ADEA are
subject to compulsory arbitration. 139 ' The Court's decision in that case
should support the Court's "current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes"14° favoring arbitration. Indeed, the steady progression of the
Court away from the treatment of statutory rights claims as defined in
Gardner-Denver allows one to predict with a fair amount of certainty that
the Court will declare the exhaustion of arbitration procedures, as defined
in the arbitration agreement, a requirement before subsequent judicial
proceedings.
Given a finding supportive of interpreting arbitration agreements
solely on the basis of contract principals, the recognized similarity
between ADEA claims and Title VII claims... should eliminate all
questions as to the exhaustion of arbitration proceedings in the non-union
context."e With respect to exhaustion, the existence of statutory rights'
claims should provide no disincentive to the use and promotion of
arbitration agreements between employers and non-union employees.1 '
138. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
139. With respect to this case, the petition for certiorari was filed on June 26, 1990 and
presented two questions: (1) Are claims brought pursuant to the ADEA subject to
compulsory jurisdiction? and (2) Is an arbitration clause executed six years before any claim
arises under the ADEA an invalid prospective waiver? On October 1, 1990, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari with respect to the first question only.
140. Rodriguez de Quijas, 496 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
141. In Alford, Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit noted the similarity between the
arbitrability of employee claims under the ADEA and Title VII, and in that case relied in
part upon confusion of lower courts with respect to compelling the arbitration of ADEA
claims to justify not requiring the arbitrability of Title VII claims. 905 F.2d 104, 106, n.3
(5th Cir. 1990).
142. It is hoped that the Court, in its decision in Gilmer will mention the similarity
between ADEA claims and Title VII claims as there have been no petitions for certiorari
with the respect to the compulsion of arbitration for Title VII claims in the past several
years.
143. As with any general rule, there are exceptions to a universal exhaustion rule.
Many of these exceptions pertain to the enforceability of arbitration agreements, and
consequently are derived from the principles of contract law.
Though non-union arbitration agreements may be considered a private contractual
waiver of the right to jury trial made independently of any pending litigation and most courts
have enforced such agreements [Graham, supra note 8, at 1126. See generally Annotation,
Validity and Effect of Contractual Waiver of Trial by Jury, 73 A.L.R.2D 1332 (1960)], it is
suggested that where agreements to arbitrate are not complete, they will not be considered a
valid waiver of the right to a jury trial and thus will not be given exhaustive effect.
In Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), the parties to a
civil action entered into a "stipulation of settlement" that effected a waiver of a jury trial.
The court explained that because the plaintiffs repudiated the agreement, even though the
trial court entered judgment in accordance with the agreement, the agreement was not
complete and thus could not be enforced. Id. at 618. Consequently, in Bowater N. Am.
Corp. v. Murray Mach., Inc., 773 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1985), a case in which the court found
an arbitration provision in a settlement agreement enforceable, the Sixth Circuit applied the
principles of contract law in interpreting an arbitration agreement. It is arguable that the
court treated the arbitration agreement as governed by a default rule. By determining the
completeness of the settlement agreement, the court indicated its willingness to deny the
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2. Preclusion
Examination of federal court holdings shows that non-union
mandatory arbitration agreements for wrongful discharge are subject to the
principles of exhaustion. Nevertheless, unless the arbitral decisions
resulting from such agreements are given preclusive effect, these
agreements may see an increase in their usage, but they will never reach
their usage potential.
If no such binding effect exists, the benefits from arbitration are
weakened, as a dissatisfied employee will merely take "two bites at the
apple" -- after losing in arbitration, the employee would merely engage in
a lawsuit. In fact, it is arguable that without a preclusive effect, the
benefits of arbitration are virtually eliminated as the dispute resolution
benefits of the apparent bargain if the agreement had lacked specificity.
Furthermore, if it is shown that the'consent to arbitration was not voluntary,
informed, or that the parties' bargaining power was not equal, an exhaustive effect may not
be given to non-union arbitration agreements for wrongful discharge claims as it is deemed
unfair to deny the aggrieved party access to a jury. Graham, supra note 8, at 1126
("Federal courts will uphold such contractual waivers only when the party seeking
enforcement shows the consent to the waiver was both voluntary and informed and that the
parties' bargaining power was equal."). See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1977); In re Reggie Packing Co., 671 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.III. 1987); Leasing Serv. Corp. v.
Crane, 804 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1986); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1982); National Acceptance Co. v. Myca Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp.
269 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Decisions reflecting this approach to the validity of arbitration
agreements reinforce the fundamental principles of contract and the notion that statutory
rights to a trial should be considered default rules.
Furthermore, an exhaustive effect will not be granted to a non-union agreement to
arbitrate wrongful discharge claims if requiring the parties to exhaust the arbitration
procedure has the practical effect of granting or denying an injunction. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 (1988); Nelson, supra note 44, at
1015. This lack of enforcement with regard to exhaustion results from a fear of producing
"serious, perhaps irreparable consequences." Graham, supra note 8, at 1143 (quoting
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)).
Consequently, the exhaustive effect of requiring arbitration of a claim in accordance
with a non-union agreement to arbitrate wrongful discharge claims, where time is of the
essence, may be waived. However, this is only done in those few cases in which the
defendant would be denied relief if the substantive claims of arbitrability were found to rest
on a faulty construction of the non-union employment agreement. Nelson, supra note 44, at
1015. See Midwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Commonwealth Constr. Co., 801 F.2d
748 (5th Cir. 1986) (this case serves as an excellent example of the procedural morass that
could be generated by aggressive tacticians). Furthermore, Congress has determined that
once the courts have decided that the arbitration should proceed, there is no ability to appeal
this decision. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
Section 15(b) states:
Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may
not be taken from an interlocutory order -- (1) granting a stay of any
action under section 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed
under section 4 of this title; (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of
this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
See also, Nelson, supra note 44, at 1015 ("This language brings the federal practice parallel
to the state practice eliminating any forum-shopping motive grounded on appealability.").
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process would take longer and cost more as both arbitration and litigation
are undertaken.
From a normative perspective, it seems axiomatic that the parties,
in agreeing to arbitrate employment disputes, would want the arbitral
decisions to have a binding effect. However, from a theoretical
perspective, it does not seem incredible that parties would bargain for
their arbitration agreement to merely have an advisory impact on future
litigation. Thus, it is proper to postulate that the existence of a binding
effect would be a default rule that the parties could bargain around. Of
course, once this is recognized, it becomes necessary to define what the
default is. Conceivably, if the default has no binding effect, then parties
would be forced to specifically bargain around this default in their
arbitration agreement. Fortunately, the FAA addresses this issue and
defines the congressionally mandated default with regard to the preclusion
of arbitral findings.
There is a statutory implication of a preclusive effect of an arbitral
decision in section 10 of the FAA.14 This section identifies the criteria
necessary for the vacating of an arbitrator's decision. These are: (a)
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (b)
where arbitrators were evidently partial or corrupt; (c) where arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct; and (d) where arbitrators exceeded or
imperfectly executed their powers."'
If one accepts the theory of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,1 '
this specific listing of circumstances implies that no other circumstances
exist which allow for the vacating of an arbitral award. This gives the
status of exclusivity to decisions made by an arbitrator in settling an
employment dispute. It further implies that such awards are binding on
the parties unless it can be shown that an award should be vacated or that
no preclusive effect is recognized.
Additionally, the ability of non-union arbitral decisions of wrongful
discharge claims to preclude adjudication of these claims in the courts is
144. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
145. Id.
146. This phrase is defined as:
A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another. Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169
S.W.2d 321, 325 (1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okla. 487, 40 P.2d
1097, 1100 (1935). Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another.
When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an
intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Under
this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes
to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are
excluded.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 521 (6th ed. 1979).
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implied in section 9 of the FAA.1 This section provides a means of
formalizing the arbitral decision, thereby giving it the weight of the
courts:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of
the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
arbitration, and shall specify the court, that at any time within one
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may
apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the
award.... If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties,
then such application may be made to the United States court in
and for the district within which such award was made.1"
This section implies that Congress intended, as a default, that arbitral
decisions should not have a preclusive effect. By requiring a prior
agreement to confirm an arbitral award, the FAA implies that without
such a confirmation, the arbitral decision is not to have preclusive effect.
In the early 1970s, prior to Gardner-Denver, there was
controversy, not as to whether this default was intended, but to what
extent the parties had to contract around the default. As an example, the
Second Circuit originally held that, absent an agreement to confirm the
award, the court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment upon an arbitral
award.' 49 Specifically, it found that the district court had no jurisdiction
to confirm an arbitration award and enter judgment on the award where
the contract did not explicitly provide that the judgment could be
entered. ,s
However, the following year, the Second Circuit held that consent
to entry of judgment can be inferred from the parties' agreement that the
arbitrator's decision will be final:
Whatever 'final' means, it at least expresses the intent of
the parties that the issues joined and resolved in the arbitration
may not be tried de novo in any court, state or federal. Thus, the
only point left open for conjecture ... is whether the parties
147. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
148. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988) (emphasis added). Furthermore, recently it has been held
by a district court in the same circuit that by filing a lawsuit that obviously involved the
validity of an arbitration award, the plaintiff had consented to the entry of judgment on the
arbitration by a federal district court. Pennsylvania Eng. Corp. v. Islip Resources Recovery
Agency, 710 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
149. Varley v. Tarrytown Assocs., Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973). See Lehigh
Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Eng'g Co., 59 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
626 (1932); Continental Grain Co. v. Dant & Russell, 118 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1941) (where
no provision authorizing summary judgment of the arbitrator's award was contained in an
arbitration agreement, the district court's order directing that arbitration proceed within the
district in accordance with the agreement was a "final order" and appealable).
150. Varley v. Tarrytown Assocs., Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973).
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intended for judgment to be entered in a federal, as opposed to a
state, court."t
The latter decision provided an .easier means of contracting around the
default.
Given that Congress intended, as a default, that arbitral decisions
should not have a preclusive effect, the limitations of section 10 only
apply to those arbitral decisions accompanying an expressed intent to
contract around the default. Additionally, the limitations expressed in
section 11 of the FAAs would also seem to have the same restricted
applicability. In accordance with this section, a federal court may modify
or correct any award in arbitration;3 however, this authority is limited to
cases in which there was an evident material "miscalculation of figures, " M
where the arbitrators "awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,"'
and "[w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy. "6
Thus, sections 10 and 11 are merely limitations on the ability to
contract around the default, making it more difficult by reducing the
number of ways to contract around the default of non-preclusion. Given
the dependence of the applicability of sections 10 and 11 on whether
section 9 itself is applicable, this part of the analysis really focuses on the
question of whether arbitration decisions have a binding effect, assuming
such an effect has been agreed upon in the arbitration agreement. This
redefinition of the issue is seemingly unquestionably answered by contract
law. In essence, the issue is whether, given express intent to achieve a
certain benefit from their bargain, the parties should be allowed to realize
that benefit of their bargain.
If one looks to contract law theory and the FAA for the answer,
the answer is yes. Given an arbitration agreement that meets the
requirements of section 9 of the FAA, it appears that the district courts
are required by the FAA to view the arbitral decision almost as that of a
lower court. They are limited in their ability to modify or overturn an
award unless they find some form of specified error. The FAA implies
that the courts must give a tremendous degree of deference to arbitral
decisions, only altering them if one of the four limiting factors has been
met.
151. 1S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir.
1974) (emphasis in original).
152. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
153. Id. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974) Gudicial
review is limited).
154. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Court decisions prior to Gardner-Denver emphasized the
contractual nature of employment arbitration agreements and identified
standards by which the effectiveness of contracting around the default
could be judged. In addition to the debate in the Second Circuit, in the
Fifth Circuit preclusion was generally granted with limited deference in
employment discrimination cases being granted by the Court of Appeals if
seven factors had been met.' s7
These seven factors are:
(1) the contractual rights are the same as the Title VII
rights;
(2) the arbitral decision does not violate the private rights
under Title VII or public policy;
(3) the factual issues before the court are identical to the
issues before the arbitrator;
(4) the arbitrator is empowered by the collective bargaining
agreement to decide the issue of discrimination;
(5) the evidence presented at the arbitration covers all
factual issues;
(6) the arbitrator decides all factual issues presented to the
court; and
(7) the arbitration procedure is fair and adequate.'"
Courts also considered fairness of the arbitration proceeding to be
of paramount importance, declaring that the arbitral decision system
would be considered fair and given preclusive effect if:
(1) the decision-making entity or person and the process
itself were both fair and impartial;
(2) the final decision rendered was based on a full and
adequate record;
(3) the employee expressly or implicitly consented to the
form's authority; and
(4) the legal right claimed was based on the employment
contract and not on statute or on a general legal right
and principle inviting public policy.'
The more fair the procedure, the more likely that its decision will be
granted preclusive effect.
The existence of these lists of factors indicates a treatment of
section 9 as establishing a default rule. The items listed can be viewed as
157. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
158. Guidry & Huffman, supra note 23, at 22 (referencing Rios v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972)).
159. WESTIN & FELIU, supra note 4, at 271-72.
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standards by which compliance with section 9's requirement to agree to
confirmation could be judged. Meeting the requirements is both an
indication of desiring to have the arbitral award confirmed,"6 and an
indication of adequately contracting around the default, and thus being
able to establish a preclusive effect for the arbitral decision.
Despite the strong congressional signal to treat the preclusion of
arbitral decisions as a default subject to compliance with section 9, and
the creation of standards by which that compliance could be measured, the
Supreme Court, in Gardner-Denver, bifurcated the application of the
default between claims based on non-statutory rights and statutory rights.
For non-statutory rights, the Court found that an arbitral decision is final
and binding on both the employer and employee; however, with regard to
statutory rights the Court found the FAA inapplicable. 6' The Court
stated:
Under the Steelworkers trilogy, an arbitral decision is final and
binding on the employer and employee, and judicial review is
limited as to both. But in instituting an action under Title VII, the
employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision.
Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the
arbitration process."
The Court determined that the parties to the arbitration agreement could
not submit their statutory rights claim to arbitration.
Furthermore, the Court ruled out the idea that arbitral decisions
would have collateral estoppel effect with regard to factual findings and
rulings on non-statutory rights claims."2 The Court held that federal
courts "should consider the employee's [statutory rights claim] de novo.
The arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such
weight as the court deems appropriate.."64
In an effort to justify the Court's holding with regard to
preclusion, it is noted that in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court decided
to deny a preclusive effect before it had recognized the full extent and
160. Meeting the requirements of the lists is an indication that the parties meant the
arbitral decision to be final. By assuring fairness in the procedure, they indicated an intent
to have the award confirmed by the court. The Second Circuit's opinion in I/S Stavborg v.
National Metal Converters, Inc. adopts this line of reasoning. See supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
161. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60.
164. Id. See also Wellons, Inc. v. T. E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989)
(the circuit court held that the fact that the arbitration award was not confirmed by a court
and was modified by a subsequent agreement did not vitiate its collateral effect in the later
action).
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power of the FAA to regulate arbitration proceedings.'" Nevertheless, as
a consequence of the decision in Gardner-Denver, contract principles of
interpretation were limited and federal courts were more likely to give
preclusive effect to decisions based solely on the employment contract
than to those decisions based on public policy or statutory law.1"
In Byrd, the Supreme Court refused to set out a federal common
law rule of preclusion;' 67 yet, they did address the issue of preclusion,
relegating it as secondary to the decision as to whether exhaustion was
enforceable.16' The Court stated that "[t]he question of what preclusive
effect, if any, the arbitration proceedings might have is not yet before us,
however, and we do not decide it. The collateral-estoppel effect of an
arbitration proceeding is an issue only after arbitration is completed."'69
Furthermore, the Court recognized that federal courts have an obligation
to protect federal interests and that a preclusive effect given to an
arbitration proceeding may provide such protection.' 7'
In Alford, Judge Jones identified the federal rule of preclusion by
stating that "[t]he Court [in Gardner-Denver] rejected a rule of blanket
deference owed by federal courts to the prior findings of arbitrators on
Title VII issues. ... ,' Furthermore, in Alford, the court described the
decision in Gardner-Denver as being based on the concern that a labor
arbitrator, "whose duty is to enforce the parties' contract rather than
extrinsic law, would be unsuited to apply Title VIl principles. "7
Consequently, one may infer that a preclusive effect will be given
to all non-union arbitral decisions regarding wrongful discharge claims
with the exception of those involving Title VII claims, and perhaps with
165. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Alexander predates the Court's decisions giving fall reign to the FAA, and no FAA
question is likely to have been considered in Alexander.").
166. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (parties may agree
to limit or waive remedies for rights they create by contract but are on less firm ground in
agreeing to waive remedies that public policy may compel).
167. Id. at 222 ("lI]t is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any
preclusive effect on the litigation of non-arbitrable federal claims.").
168. Id. at 223.
169. Id. However, the Court did state that the full-faith-and-credit statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1738, does not apply to arbitration decisions as the preclusive effect given by the statute
applies only to state judicial hearings. Id. at 222-23 ('The full-faith-and-credit statute
requires that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to a State's judicial proceedings
as would the courts of the State rendering the judgment, and since arbitration is not a
judicial proceeding, we held that the statute does not apply to arbitration awards. McDonald
v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88, (1984) (emphasis in original). The same analysis
inevitably would apply to any unappealed state arbitration proceedings.').
170. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985) ('Significantly,
McDonald also establishes that courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by
determining the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding.").
171. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
172. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
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the exception of those involving claims based on alleged violations of
other statutorily created rights.5 73 However, despite this logic, the most
definitive Supreme Court statement on the issue was made in Byrd, where
instead of recognizing a preclusive effect for all non-union arbitral
decisions, the Court chose to emphasize that federal interests should be
protected through an application of collateral estoppel rules. 74
Interestingly enough, the application of collateral estoppel rules
provides a sufficient guarantee of a binding effect to justify the use of
arbitration agreements. Theoretically, a specific Supreme Court finding
that arbitral decisions have preclusive effect is not required once the Court
has agreed that collateral estoppel rules should apply.
Given that the principle of exhaustion is firmly established and
there no longer exists an exception to compelling arbitration for statutory
rights claims, the principles of contract law guarantee that the courts will
give a great deal of deference to arbitral decisions, provided that the
arbitration agreement was made in accordance with the standards required
by section 9 of the FAA.
To understand this contention, it is important to realize that the
Supreme Court, in Gardner-Denver, did provide that courts could use
their discretion in deciding how much weight to give an arbitral decision.
In a footnote, the Court stated that although they would "adopt no
standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision,"'7s relevant
factors in determining the court's discretion include "the existence of
provisions in the . . agreement that conform substantially with Title VII,
the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the
record with respect to the i~sue of discrimination, and the special
competence of particular arbitrators. "'7' The Court went on to state that
"[w]here an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it greatWeight. 077
173. See Gillette & Flanagan, supra note 22 at 20 (quoting Mazurak, supra note 31 at
624). ("While claim preclusion is unavailable for statutory claims, courts must and probably
will give greater preclusive effect to factual issues determined in arbitration.").
174. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985) which stated:
We believe that the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is
significantly less well settled than the lower court opinions might suggest,
and that the consequence of this misconception has been the formulation of
unnecessarily contorted procedures. We conclude that neither a stay of
proceedings, nor joined proceedings, is necessary to protect the federal
interest in the federal-court proceeding, and that the formulation of
collateral-estoppel rules affords adequate protection to that interest.
175. 415 U.S. 36, 60, n.21 (1974).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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The irony of the Court's listing of relevant factors is that they all
correspond to the standards by which courts, prior to Gardner-Denver,
measured whether parties had satisfactorily contracted around the default
in section 9 of the FAA. Furthermore, the factors of procedural fairness
and the competence of the arbitrators are assessments that are made when
determining whether the parties' contracting around the default rules
should be limited by the provisions in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.78
Consequently, findings of later federal cases have treated the
recommended procedure of applying collateral estoppel rules as only being
applicable to those claims or issues that are based on statutorily created
rights, such as those under Title VII."' With regard to these claims,
collateral estoppel rules provide significant assurances of finality to justify
mandatory non-union arbitration agreements for wrongful discharge
claims.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate when:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to the issue
previously decided;
(2) the prior action resulted in a final adjudication on the
merits;
(3) the party sought to be estopped -was either a party or in
privity with a party to the prior action; and
(4) the party sought to be estopped was given a full and fair
opportunity to be heard on the issue in the prior
action.'$
Because all statutory rights claims are arbitrable, given the development in
the principle of exhaustion, even if one party brings a statutory rights
claim later in the courts, the factual findings and the arbitral decisions
with regard to non-statutory rights should be given collateral estoppel
effect,' presuming they were confirmed by the court in accordance with
section 9.
178. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
179. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990).
180. Collateral Estoppel--Arbitration Decisions, 89 FED. LIT. 234, 235 (1990) (citing
Wellons, Inc. v. T. E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989)). See Arkla
Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1158 (1985).
181. The Fifth Circuit, prior to the Byrd decision, has held that "district courts should
decide arbitrable pendent claims when a nonarbitrable federal claim is before them, because
otherwise the findings in the arbitration proceeding might have collateral-estoppel effect in a
subsequent federal proceeding." Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17, 221
(1985). This implies a collateral estoppel effect for arbitral findings of fact; and given that
arbitration is compulsory, it appears that the Fifth Circuit's fears have become reality.
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Given the applicability of collateral estoppel,"2 and the Supreme
Court's suggested factors for determining evidentiary effect,'13 the Second
Circuit has held that where plaintiffs to a cause of action had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate an issue in an arbitration proceeding, collateral
estoppel was proper and required in order to avoid re-litigation of the
arbitral finding.' That court required collateral estoppel even though
evidentiary standards for arbitration proceedings are not as strict as those
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'8
The federal courts have consistently held that arbitral decisions
should be given preclusive effect. In light of the erosion of the statutory
rights exception to the principle of exhaustion, such an exception for the
issue of preclusion makes no sense. However, even if preclusion is not
granted, the application of contract principles and the principles of
collateral estoppel achieve nearly the same practical effect.
The Court recognizes the evidentiary value of arbitral decisions,
and as long as parties fashion their arbitration agreements their intention
to contract around the default of section 9 of the FAA is clear, sufficient
procedural fairness, adequacy of the record, and competency of arbitrators
will be guaranteed. Thus, the courts, even accepting the rule in Gardner-
Denver, should apply the rules of collateral estoppel for non-statutory
claims and give the arbitral decisions such great weight as to effectively
achieve a preclusive effect, thus rationalizing the merits of arbitration
agreements for non-union employment disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increase in the cost and frequency of litigating non-union
employment disputes for wrongful dismissal has forced both employers
182. For purposes of this analysis, of the four factors determining the appropriateness
of applying collateral estoppel, points one and three are assumed as given. Also, points two
and four, concerning finality and fairness respectively, have been addressed earlier in this
analysis. Guidry & Huffman, supra note 23 (finality); Pennsylvania Eng'g. Corp. v. Islip
Resources Recovery Agency, 710 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), reh'g denied, 714 F.
Supp. 634 (1989). WESTIN & FELIU, supra note 3, at 108 (fairness). Additionally, the
Eighth Circuit has noted that collateral estoppel will be granted as arbitration awards may
constitute a final judgment. See City of Bismarck v. Toltz, King, Duvall, Anderson and
Assocs., Inc., 855 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1988); French v. Jinright & Ryan, P.C., 735 F.2d
433 (l1th Cir. 1984). Finally, it is noted that unless the arbitration procedures were
inherently unfair, i.e., they exhibited an egregious deviation from the norm or the decision
unreliable, the court should refuse to closely scrutinize the arbitration process for fairness
and due process and to overturn an arbitration award. See Sanders v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ivery v. United States, 686
F.2d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1982); Gillette & Flanagan, supra note 23, at 12-13.
183. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
184. Benjamin v. Traffic Exec. Ass'n E. R.Rs., 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989). See
generally Note, Bridging the Procedural Gap: Arbitration Decisions as a Basis for
Collateral Estoppel, 5 OH. ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 189 (1990).
185. Benjamin v. Traffic Exec. Ass'n E. R.Rs., 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
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and employees to seek alternative means of resolving these disputes.
Mandatory arbitration agreements provide one means of resolution.
Inclusion of these agreements in employment contracts acts as a
prophylactic measure that prevents the waste of resources, and does not
require the continuation of an employer-employee relationship that has
gone sour. Furthermore, arbitration of employment disputes eliminates
the problems of cost, predictability, and discomfort associated with
conflict resolution by means of a trial.
These arbitration agreements are governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act. The Act applies to virtually all non-union employer-
employee relationships that meet the very broad definition of "interstate
commerce." This Act not only permits arbitration, but compels it.
Furthermore, an arbitral decision is final and binding and the Act provides
a strong implication of preclusive effect for arbitral decisions.
In applying the FAA to non-union employment agreements to
arbitrate wrongful discharge claims, federal courts, with few exceptions
derived from the application of contract principles, will find the
agreements enforceable. Additionally, the Supreme Court requires all
claims pertaining to a non-union arbitration agreement be first handled
through the arbitration process, establishing and enforcing the principle of
exhaustion. Given their enforceability, the courts are required to compel
arbitration in those instances in which one party tries to circumvent the
agreement for a non-judicial settlement of the case. As long as the
agreement is complete and voluntary, these agreements should be available
for widespread use, despite a lack of exhaustive effect. The validity of
the agreement is determined through the application of contract principles.
The federal courts have also consistently held that arbitral decisions
should be given preclusive effect. Only a few claims, notably those based
on alleged violations of statutorily created rights, have been exempted
from claim preclusion. With regard to these exemptions, the Supreme
Court has fashioned a rule so -that arbitral decisions of these claims are
given evidentiary weight and may result in issue preclusion. This rule is
directly in accordance with the requirements established by the courts for
determining whether arbitration agreements have satisfactorily contracted
around the default of section 9 of the FAA.
The FAA has been accepted by the courts as the standard for the
governing of non-union arbitration proceedings. It has been interpreted so
as to guarantee the exhaustion and preclusion of non-union mandatory
employment agreements to arbitrate wrongful discharge claims. Because
of its guarantee, employers and employees should look to arbitration as a
viable, cost-effective alternative to judicial action in settling their disputes.
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